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Abstract 
Experiments and flight tests have shown that airport surface operations can be enhanced by using 
synthetic vision and associated technologies, employed on a Head-Up Display (HUD) and head-
down display electronic moving maps (EMM).  Although HUD applications have shown the 
greatest potential operational improvements, the research noted that two major limitations during 
ground operations were its monochrome form and limited, fixed field-of-regard.  A potential 
solution to these limitations may be the application of advanced Head Worn Displays (HWDs) 
particularly during low-visibility operations wherein surface movement is substantially limited 
because of the impaired vision of pilots and air traffic controllers. The paper describes the results 
of ground simulation experiments conducted at the NASA Langley Research Center.  The results 
of the experiments showed that the fully integrated HWD concept provided significantly 
improved path performance compared to using paper charts alone.  When comparing the HWD 
and HUD concepts, there were no statistically-significant differences in path performance or 
subjective ratings of situation awareness and workload.  Implications and directions for future 
research are described.  
 SVS HWD for Surface OPS  3 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck (IIFD) project, under NASA's Aviation Safety 
Program, comprises a multi-disciplinary research effort to develop flight deck technologies that 
mitigate operator-, automation-, and environment-induced hazards.  Towards this objective, the 
IIFD project is developing crew/vehicle interface technologies that reduce the propensity for 
pilot error, minimize the risks associated with pilot error, and proactively overcome aircraft 
safety barriers that would otherwise constrain the full realization of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) (Joint Planning and Development Office [JPDO], 2004).  Part 
of this research effort involves the use of synthetic and enhanced vision systems and advanced 
display media as enabling crew-vehicle interface technologies to meet these safety challenges. 
While NextGen concepts envision the capability to handle up to a 3-fold increase in air 
traffic, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) continues to have runway incursion 
prevention on its top six most wanted list for aviation safety (NTSB, 2006).  The increase in air 
traffic could potentially result in a concomitant increase in runway incursions requiring a critical 
need to develop both air- and ground-based solutions. In the 4-year period between 2001 and 
2004, 1,395 runway incursion events were reported to the FAA which is a rate of almost 1 
runway incursion event per day (FAA, 2004).  Also during this time, over 60% of the FAA 
towered airports reported at least one runway incursion event. These statistics and events are 
cause for alarm.  The worst aviation accident, in terms of fatalities, occurred in 1977 when two 
fully loaded 747 airplanes collided on a runway at Tenerife airport.  Moreover, each year there 
are reports of close “near-miss” runway incursions that happen with sufficient regularity at the 
world's busiest airports to pose perhaps the most significant hazard confronting aviation today.   
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One such airport plagued with runway incursions is Chicago O'Hare International Airport 
(FAA identifier: ORD).  Chicago O'Hare is a complex airfield and represents one of the world's 
busiest and most challenging airports for surface operations.  Current runway incursion safety 
mitigations employ a “layered” approach using technology, training, and awareness.  The ORD 
airport authority has identified “hot spots” which are areas where incursions are likely to occur.  
In these areas, special ground traffic and aircraft handling are designed so that nominal 
operations minimize incursion potential.  These hot spots are published and disseminated to 
aircraft and ground crew operators to heighten vigilance when operating in and near these areas.  
ORD operates an Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) which provides warnings of 
incursions to controllers.  Even with these protocols and technology implementations, there have 
been several close calls (FAA, 2004).   
Emerging NextGen concepts may further increase the task-load on the flight deck, 
precipitating the need for display technologies tailored to support these new operational 
requirements.  For instance, automated surface managements system are being developed that 
utilize dynamic algorithms to calculate the most efficient movement of all surface traffic to 
increase the efficiency with which airport surfaces are utilized.  If these systems are to be 
implemented, pilots will be required to comply with 4-D taxi clearances, in which a pilot is 
required to be at a specific location at a specific time.  Furthermore, pilots will be expected to 
“maintain separation,” even during these “super density” operations, from other aircraft 
regardless of visibility conditions, just as they do today during visual flight operations.  These 
emerging “equivalent visual operations” concepts will require substantially more critical 
information to help pilots navigate around the airport without “natural visual” references to 
ensure safe separation from other aircraft.  These operations and their information requirements 
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likely may not be supportable by today’s flight deck displays, lending to the need for research to 
investigate other alternatives that may better be tailored to what is envisioned for the air 
transportation system of the future.  
Past Research 
Previous research has shown that while the capability may be available to take-off and 
land aircraft in near zero visibility and zero ceiling weather, the operational tempo and safety 
within the airport terminal area is significantly degraded due to limitations in surface operations.  
These surface operations include taxiing and maneuvering aircraft and vehicles to/from the 
active runways and gates. 
The Taxiway-Navigation And Situation Awareness (T-NASA) concept (Figure 1) was 
developed to improve the efficiency and safety of airport surface operations in Category IIIB 
weather (no decision height, <1200 ft {366 m} Runway Visual Range (RVR)) (Foyle et al., 
1996).  T-NASA uses a suite of cockpit displays - a HUD and an Electronic Moving Map 
(EMM) concept, implemented on a Navigation Display (ND) or Electronic Flight Bag (EFB).  
The concepts have been shown to provide the following benefits, in various degrees of measure 
and success: 
• Eliminated hold location errors and failure to hold errors  
• Allowed increased taxi speeds  
• Eliminated taxi navigation errors in low-visibility and night conditions  
• Enabled better awareness of airport traffic  
• Improved pilot-Air Traffic Control (ATC) communication of clearance  
• Improved Captain-First Officer intra-cockpit pilot communication  
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Insert Figure 1 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Under the T-NASA concept, the EMM includes a labeled airport layout, ownship 
position, positions of other traffic, graphical route guidance, text clearance window, and ground 
speed and heading indicators.  The EMM depicts the cleared taxi route graphically, via the 
magenta path, and textually, via the text box on the bottom of the map. Hold short instructions 
are portrayed with a yellow hold bar, and the portion of the route beyond the hold changes from 
magenta to yellow. Airport traffic is depicted in real-time, and pilots can choose to view aircraft 
icons with or without data tags. All information is dynamic and updated in real-time. 
The EMM is designed with the primary purpose of aiding navigation and situation 
awareness; it is not designed to support the control of the aircraft.  As such, the map purposely 
lacks specific detail regarding the aircraft's position relative to the centerline, location of wheels, 
speed or braking parameters, or an accurate depiction of aircraft size and wingspan. 
In contrast, the HUD uses “scene-linked” symbology for conformal display against the 
out-the-window environment (when visible) which theoretically leads to efficient cognitive 
processing of both the symbology and the environment, and mitigates problems of attentional 
tunneling and symbology fixation.  The taxi symbology contains taxiway centerline markers and 
taxiway edge cones.  Virtual signage aids in augmenting cleared-path awareness.  Taxiway 
information provides enhanced situation awareness for taxi navigation. 
Simulation data were analyzed to pinpoint the mechanisms by which T-NASA 
technology components could mitigate classes of surface operations navigation errors (pilot 
deviations) (Hooey & Foyle, 2006).  A taxonomy of 3 error classes was used.  The simulation 
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data replicated current-day operations and also included trials with T-NASA technologies 
including data-link, EMM, and HUD.  
The error decomposition showed that pilots committed navigation errors on 17% of 
current-day operations trials (in low-visibility and night), distributed roughly equally across the 3 
error classes.  When using T-NASA technologies, the error data showed a unique set of 
contributing factors and mitigating solutions:  
• Planning errors were mitigated by technologies that provided an unambiguous 
record of the clearance (data-link and the EMM, which possessed a text-based 
clearance).   
• Decision errors were mitigated by technologies that provided both local and 
global awareness including information about the distance to and direction of the 
next turn, current ownship location, and a graphical depiction of the route (as 
provided by the EMM and HUD together).  
• Execution errors were best mitigated by the HUD, which disambiguated the 
environment and depicted the cleared taxi route. 
Further enhancements to the T-NASA concepts have evolved based on follow-on 
research and testing.  In particular, tactical turn guidance, in the form of so-called “breadcrumbs” 
or other manifestations, have shown to significantly aid in tactical surface operations guidance, 
particularly for aircraft which require over-steer to remain on the taxiway centerline (Figure 2, 
(Jones & Rankin, 2002)).  Without non-conformal guidance information, the conformal 
information such as the centerline and edge markings would not be drawn on the limited HUD 
field-of-view or the information that was provided would be difficult to interpret. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Insert Figure 2 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
The key to preventing runway incursions is to ensure that pilots know (Young & Jones, 
1998): 
1. Where they are located 
2. Where other traffic is located 
3. Where they are cleared to go on the airport surface 
The T-NASA concepts and its instantiations contribute significantly toward these 
elements.  However, not knowing the above or deviating from clearances, the flight crew and 
ATC should be alerted to the situation.  NASA's Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS) 
program developed methodologies for flight deck alerting, targeted toward the prediction of 
runway incursion to provide immediate alerting for the principal participants in the operation 
(i.e., the flight crews).  The T-NASA concepts provide guidance and situation awareness 
information to mitigate many factors contributing toward runway incursions, but a final 
protective “wrapper” was felt to be warranted nonetheless (Jones & Prinzel, 2006).   Since the 
objective of the present research was to focus evaluations on proactive surface operation 
situation awareness, none of the concepts tested included flight deck alerting (i.e., RIPS 
concepts). 
Present Study 
The present study was an extension of this previous research to evaluate if emerging 
synthetic vision and head-worn display technologies (Figure 3) can provide further safety and 
operational improvements and enable an application solution that would better enable an 
implementation path for synthetic and enhanced vision technologies in support of NextGen 
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operations.  This test was the second of two studies evaluating the efficacy of head-worn displays 
for surface operations (Arthur et al., 2007). 
__________________________________________________________________ 




The Experiment was conducted in the Research Flight Deck (RFD) simulator at NASA 
Langley Research Center (LaRC).  The RFD was a fixed-based, dual-pilot simulator consisting 
of a collimated 200˚ out-the-window visual.  The out-the-window visual consisted of the airport, 
including taxiways and runways with appropriate markings, airport lighting, model aircraft 
representing traffic and simulated weather/lighting conditions.  The visual acuity of the out-the-
window visual provided a Snellen equivalent of approximately 20/80.  The RFD was equipped 
with a 30˚ H x 24˚ V HUD on the captain's side.  The HWD, worn only by the captain, was an 
800H x 600V pixel, full color display with see-through capability, 60 Hz refresh and a pilot 
selectable brightness knob.   
The subject pilots placed the HWD near the right eye so that it was visible by glancing up 
which maintained unimpeded stereoscopic vision for out-the-window monitoring.  The resulting 
display was conformal to the real-world (out-the-window visual) if the pilot tilted his or her head 
down.  This procedure was also used to minimize binocular rivalry.  An optical head tracker 
provided the head orientation data.  The RFD had 8 Size D (6.4 inch {16.3 cm} square viewable 
area) head-down displays typical of those found in modern “glass” cockpits:  captain and first 
officer PFD and ND, two engine displays on the center aisle and two outboard auxiliary displays.  
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For both experiments, the first officer's outboard auxiliary display was used as a repeater display 
of the captain's head-up display.  The pilot controls were a tiller, throttles, rudder pedals (nose 
wheel steering) and differential toe brakes.  The simulated aircraft for both experiments was a 
medium- to long-haul commercial passenger aircraft, classified as an International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) aerodrome code D. 
Evaluation Pilots 
Twelve commercial flight crews (a captain and first officer) participated in the 
experiment.  Each flight crew flew for the same company to ensure crew coordination and 
cohesion with regard to surface operation procedures.  The captains had an average of over 
15,000 flight hours with 29 years total flight time and the first officers had an average of over 
9,000 flight hours with an average of 26 years total flight time.  Two-thirds of the captains 
required corrective lenses.  The subject crews were given a 45-minute briefing on the display 
concepts and the evaluation tasks.  After the briefing, a 45-minute training session was 
conducted to familiarize the subjects with the RFD simulator, the HUD, the HWD device, and 
the piloting task.  Only the captain had a head-up display; the first officer had a head-down 
repeater display of the captain's head-up device.  A simple eye dominance test was performed 
after the training briefing.  Of the 12 subject captains, 11 were right eye dominant.  The HWD 
was viewed with the right eye for all subjects.  The HWD is compatible with eyeglasses.  
Following training, 2.5 hours of data collection was conducted.  The total experiment time for 
each subject crew was approximately 4 hours. 
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EXPERIMENTAL TEST 
Evaluation Tasks 
Crews conducted simulated taxi operations at Chicago O'Hare International Airport.  The 
display concept and weather were experimentally varied.   
A total of 25 different taxi scenarios were used in the study.  The scenarios covered a 
range of realistic scenarios.  The weather state for the out-the-window scene was varied between 
night-time with unlimited visibility Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), and daytime with 
700 RVR (213 m).  All tasks involved exiting the active runway and taxiing to the airport 
movement area.  Pilots were instructed to taxi at a speed they thought appropriate for the task 
and to avoid other aircraft.  The subject crews were briefed to follow their company guidelines as 
far as taxi speeds and procedures.  Further, crews were instructed that the safety of the aircraft 
should never be compromised. 
One of the 25 scenarios was a rare-event (Foyle & Hooey, 2003) runway incursion (see 
below).  Rare event scenarios offer the opportunity to evaluate the display concepts in off-
nominal situations.  For this final run, the visibility was reduced to 500 RVR (152 m) to set-up 
the taxiway incursion rare event scenario.   
Nominal Taxi Evaluation Tasks 
Before each data trial, the flight crews were briefed on their current location and expected 
runway turnoff.  Each trial began with an initial speed of 10 or 15 knots on an active runway 
followed by an immediate call from the tower controller.  Once clear of the runway, the first 
officer switched to ground frequency and called the ground controller for clearance.  The ground 
controller provided the taxi instructions along with a data-linked message of the cleared route.  If 
requested, the taxi instructions were repeated to the crew.  All ATC calls were automated and 
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various other ATC communications were played to simulate typical radio party-line chatter.  In 
addition, other pre-recorded aircraft traffic taxied around the airport surface.  Crews were 
instructed that the traffic was pre-recorded; therefore, they should give way to all traffic.  
Further, they were briefed that the ground controller would not provide traffic awareness cues. 
Runway Incursion Rare Event Scenario 
The final run of the day created a potential nose-to-nose taxiway incursion.  The nose-to-
nose rare event was designed to provide insight into traffic awareness between the different 
display concepts.  A common occurrence at ORD is when the terminal area is congested, aircraft 
may be given a “double back” clearance to create spacing and clear other taxiways.  These 
events provide for a situation where two aircraft become “stuck” facing each other on a taxiway 
without taxi clearance to maneuver.  When this occurs, it requires an aircraft tug to separate the 
two airplanes.  Such occurrences are serious because a nose-to-nose situation can significantly 
reduce airport efficiency to resolve the incursion (FAA Class D level incursion).   
To induce this “nose-to-nose” taxiway incursion rare event, crews were asked to turn-off 
Runway 9R onto Taxiway Mike 7 (M7) and contact ground.  Ground cleared the aircraft to 
follow Taxiways Mike, Delta, and hold short of Mike-6 on Delta.  Taxiing parallel on the first 
officer’s side were two aircraft on Taxiway Bravo, holding short of Delta-4 waiting to enter 
Taxiway Delta.  Upon arriving and holding short of Mike-6, the flight crew contacted ground 
and were then given a ground controller instruction for them to turn onto Taxiway Mike-6 which, 
unknown  to the crew and ground ATC, was already occupied by a small commuter jet (Figure 
4).   
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 4 here 
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__________________________________________________________________  
 
The scenario set-up was typical of occurrence at ORD, and elsewhere, when an aircraft 
misses a turn and stops on the taxiway awaiting further instruction. A small commuter aircraft 
has turned-off Runway 9R onto Mike-6 but was told to hold short of Mike (not to continue on 
Mike-6).  Therefore, if the commuter aircraft had complied with the instruction to turn down 
Mike, it would have been acceptable and provided the necessary separation.  However, the 
aircraft accidentally crossed Mike and continued on Mike-6, then and stopped once they had 
realized the mistake.  They were in the process of switching over to ground when the evaluation 
crew received the ground instruction to turn down Mike-6, creating the “nose-to-nose” situation.   
The visibility was reduced to 500 RVR (152 m) for this scenario so that the traffic was 
difficult to see, but still detectable out-the-window.  The incurring aircraft was on the left 
(captain's) side.  The scenario also depicted two additional aircraft on the first officer's side to 
serve as a potential distraction to the crew’s attention.  These two aircraft also lent credibility to 
the amended clearance to turn onto Mike-6 taxiway for clearance separation from these two B-
747-400 aircraft.  To further increase the workload of the first officer, a complex ground 
clearance was given close to the incursion point.  Therefore, the prevention of the nose-to-nose 
situation depended almost entirely on the captain's awareness – the principal subject of the 
experimental display variation.   
The rare event display condition was evenly distributed across flight crews between each 
of the 4 display concepts; therefore each of the 4 display concepts contained 3 rare event data 
points total.  The scenario was presented on the last trial of the day but this was not 
communicated to the pilots, who were unaware of the number of trials to be presented. 
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Display Concepts 
Four display concepts were tested (Figure 5): 
1. A Paper Chart of the ORD airport surface representative of today’s airline 
equipage.  This concept is hereafter referred to as the “Paper,” 
2. A head down only display consisting of an advanced EMM containing iconic 
traffic, clearance and routing information.  This concept is hereafter referred to as 
the “Advanced EMM,”  
3. A HUD concept with an advanced EMM head-down display.  The scene-linked  
HUD symbology consisted of a 3-dimensional depiction of the cleared route by 
highlighting the taxiway edge lines and centerlines.  In addition, non-conformal 
symbology was provided for precision guidance (“breadcrumb” display).  The 
head down display was the advanced EMM described in Item 2 above.  This 
concept is hereafter referred to as the “Advanced HUD,” and  
4. An advanced HWD concept coupled with a head tracker.  With virtual traffic and 
routing information and an advanced EMM head-down display.  This concept is 
hereafter referred to as the “Advanced HWD.” 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 5 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Advanced Electronic Moving Map Display  
With the exception of the Paper concept, all display concepts employed a head-down  
EMM display shown on both the captain and first officer navigation displays.  The  EMM 
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consisted of a perspective, track-up view of the airport showing an ownship symbol, ground 
speed, heading, surface movement areas, centerlines, airport surface labels, and current range 
selection.  Both the captain and first officer had independent range controls for the EMM, which 
consisted of 4 zoom levels.  In addition to the perspective track-up mode, the pilot could select a 
north-up mode that showed the entire airport view from directly above. 
Advanced Head-Up Display 
The Advanced HUD display concept was based on the RIPS (Jones, 2005; Jones, Quach 
& Young, 2001) and T-NASA (Foyle et al, 1996; Atkins, 1999) concepts albeit without 
incursion alerting (Figure 6).  The head-up display showed current ground speed in digital 
format, the current taxiway, next cleared taxiway, centerline markers and virtual cones on the 
taxiway edge.  Additional cues were given for turns.  These cues consisted of turn flags and 
virtual turn signs (similar to roadway turn signs) (Hooey, Foyle, & Andre, 2001).  Runway 
holding positions were displayed as a single solid line at the hold short locations.  Also, a virtual 
stop sign was placed in the middle of the hold short line.  A non-conformal taxi director display 
provided an intuitive display of the relationship between the taxiway centerline and the aircraft's 
landing gear.  The captain could remove all the symbols from the HUD display by pressing a 
declutter button.  The auto-throttle disconnect button was used for declutter because it was 
conveniently located and auto-throttles were not used in the experiment.  A second press of the 
auto-throttle disconnect restored all of the HUD symbology.  The captain also had control of the 
brightness level of the HUD.   
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 6 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Advanced Head-Worn Display 
The Advanced HWD concept provided a conformal (head-tracked) virtual airport view 
from the pilot's eye perspective (Figure 7).  The virtual airport view consisted of the ORD 
airport, buildings, surface movement areas and centerlines.  (The information elements and 
formatting for this Synthetic Vision scene were not established experimentally, but were chosen 
as an initial basis for concept evaluation.  Follow-on studies will be used to establish these 
information requirements.)  Taxi signage was displayed in the HWD.  This signage was modeled 
to appear to be actual airport surface signage; however, the HWD signage was placed on the side 
of an upcoming turn, for better visibility, and did not necessarily correlate with the actual out-
the-window sign placement.  The Advanced HWD employed a 3-dimensional generic aircraft 
model to depict traffic, the cleared route was shown as a magenta overlay on the taxiway 
centerline, text was displayed for the cleared route and for the distance to the next taxiway, and 
taxiway edge cones depicted the edge lines of the cleared route.  Like the HUD, virtual turn signs 
were used as an additional turn cue and hold short cues were denoted by virtual stop signs.  
Similar to the HUD, a non-conformal insert depicted a plan-view of the cleared route, together 
with the airplane outline and location of the nose and main gear.  The pilot could remove this 
non-conformal display by pressing the auto-throttle disconnect button.  A second press of the 
auto-throttle disconnect button removed all symbology in the HWD.  A third press restored all 
HWD symbology .  Also, the captain could control the brightness of the display via a rotary 
knob, located on the center pedestal.  The Advanced HWD format represents the most complex, 
but also the most preferred configuration based on a usability study conducted prior to the 
simulation experiment (Arthur, Prinzel, Williams, & Kramer, 2006). 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 7 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
The HWD concept was implemented using commercial off-the-shelf equipment and was 
not necessarily representative of the envisioned operational concept.  For instance, the HWD 
concept required alignment (known as boresighting) before the start of the data trials.  A fielded 
concept, however, should not require a manual alignment procedure and should instead be 
aligned through an automated process.  An alignment grid was displayed on the out-the-window 
visuals and the HWD.  The captain boresighted the HWD by aligning the grids through head 
movement.  Once the grids were aligned, the captain verbally called “alignment” and the 
boresight parameters were saved.  The conformality of the virtual airport view was then 
dependent upon the accuracy of the boresighting.  The conformal virtual airport view was shown 
whenever the captain slightly tilted his/her head down.  When properly aligned, the virtual 
taxiways overlayed the actual taxiways.  
RESULTS 
Quantitative Results 
Taxi Performance for All Data Runs 
A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) on Root Mean Square (RMS) path 
error, taxi speed, and time-to-taxi yielded significant effects for display condition, F(9, 
363)=4.18, p<0.001; visibility condition F(3, 149)=5.71, p=0.001; and their interaction 
F(9,363)=3.60, p<0.001.  Follow-up univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicated that 
time-to-taxi was not significantly (p>0.05) affected by display condition but taxi speed and RMS 
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path error were.  Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) tests revealed 2 unique subsets of the 
display conditions for taxi speed and for RMS path error (Figure 8).  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 8 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Pilots taxied significantly slower and had more path error when using Paper charts than 
with the Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, and Advanced HWD.  On average, pilots had 5.4 ft 
less path error and taxied 0.4 knots quicker during Day 700 RVR conditions than in Night VMC. 
Navigational Errors 
Navigational errors, when they occurred, were divided into 2 categories: major and minor 
(McCann et al, 1998).  A major navigation error is defined as a loss of navigational awareness, 
which resulted in a wrong turn or a failure to turn.  A minor navigation error is defined as a 
failure to remain on route but it was immediately noticed and corrected by the crew.  A 
navigation error, which involved an incursion with other aircraft, was accounted for in a different 
measure and not captured as a navigational error.  A total of 14 navigational errors were made, 
where 7 were classified as major errors and 7 were classified as minor.  Most of the errors (8 of 
14 total errors) occurred with the Baseline Paper Chart concept (Figure 9).  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 9 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
An ANOVA was performed on the number of navigational errors committed by the crew 
with the display concept (Baseline Paper, Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, Advanced HWD), 
navigational error category (major, minor), and visibility (Night VMC, Day 700 RVR) as the 
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main factors.  Display concept, F(3,33)=2.93, p=0.048; navigational error category, 
F(1,11)=9.43, p=0.011; and the interaction between the display concept and navigational error 
category, F(3,113)=4.12, p=0.008) were significant.  The remaining main factors and interactions 
were not significant (p>0.05) for the number of navigational errors committed.  Post-hoc tests 
(SNK, using α=0.05) showed 2 unique subsets for the display concept: 1) Advanced EMM, 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD (fewest navigational errors) and 2) Paper.  The crews had 
fewer minor navigational errors than major errors with the concepts tested, most notably within 
the Baseline Paper concept. 
Taxi Incursions 
A taxiway incursion event was defined as a collision with another aircraft or making a 
turn in front of another aircraft and creating a close call.  A total of 2 incursion events occurred, 
one with the Advanced EMM concept and one with the Advanced HUD concept.  An ANOVA 
was performed on the number of taxi incursions committed by the crew with the display concept 
(Baseline Paper, Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, Advanced HWD), and visibility (Night 
VMC, Day 700 RVR) as the main factors.  There were no significant differences (p>0.05) among 
the main factors or their interactions for this measure. 
Required Navigation Performance 
To quantify path performance from this experiment, the principles of Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP) for surface operations were employed (Cassell, Smith, & Hicok, 
1999).  For this experiment, the visibility conditions were such that RNP requirements for an 
ICAO code D aircraft stipulates path deviation within ±7.2 ft (±2.2 m) of the route centerline 
95% of the time (Figure 10).  RNP was assumed in this analysis to be solely a function of path 
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error; that is, path performance was quantified as Flight Technical Error (FTE) and RNP was 
computed assuming no errors contributions due to path definition or positioning error.   
None of the display concepts met RNP requirements (i.e., none were within  ±7.2 ft {±2.2 
m} of route centerline 95% of the time).   
Analysis showed that time-of-day was not significant, F(1,10)=7.563, p=0.094.  
However, an ANOVA revealed that display type was significant, F(3,10)=3.719, p=0.05.  Post-
hoc tests on display type show two overlapping subsets:  1) Advanced EMM (mean=12.5 ft {3.8 
m}), Advanced HUD (mean=13.5 ft {4.1 m}) and Advanced HWD (mean=13 ft {4 m})  and 2) 
Advanced HWD (mean=13 ft {4 m}), Advanced HUD (mean=13.5 ft {4.1 m}), Paper 
(mean=15.75 ft {4.8 m}).  Paper had significantly worse lateral RNP during surface operations 
than the Advanced EMM; however there was no significant differences between Paper and the 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 10 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Rare Event 
For the Paper Chart display concept, which did not have path or traffic information, all 3 
crews got into a nose-to-nose condition.  For the display concepts that had iconic traffic display 
(Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD), all crews were able to avoid the nose-
to-nose situation. 
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Qualitative Results 
Post-Run Questionnaires 
Several questionnaires were given at the end of each data run.  At the end of the day, 
paired-comparison questionnaires were given to both the captain and first officer. 
Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
An ANOVA was performed for the dependent variable, situation awareness (SA), 
derived from flight crew ratings on the SART where SA = Understanding - (Demand - Supply).  
Analysis found a significant effect for display condition, F(3,15) = 3.77, p < 0.05.  A SNK test 
revealed two unique subsets: (1) Advanced HWD (135.25), Advanced HUD (142.16), or 
Advanced EMM (142.38) (no significant differences between) - Highest SA and (2) Baseline 
Paper condition (82.0) - Lowest SA. 
Taxi Situation Awareness Questions 
Flight crews were administered a Likert post-run experimental questionnaire (1 to 5 
scale; 1 = ``not at all''; 5 = ``very much'') after each run which asked the pilots to rate the display 
conditions contribution to: a) taxi efficiency, b) overall navigation awareness, c) route awareness 
of local controller clearance, d) route awareness of ground controller clearance, e) surface traffic 
awareness, f) direction awareness, and g) taxi safety (McCann et al., 1998).  Advanced concepts 
(path, clearance and traffic displayed) were rated significantly higher than the Baseline Paper 
display concept for all questions.  An ANOVA revealed significant effects for all dependent 
variables, p < 0.05.  Post-hoc SNK tests were performed on these dependent variables resulting 
in two unique subsets: (1) no significant differences between Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, 
and Advanced HWD, and (2) Baseline Paper condition.  Only flight crew ratings of display 
contribution to taxi efficiency were found not to be significant. 
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Post-Test Paired Comparisons 
A MANOVA statistical procedure was performed on four paired comparison scales 
administered to the captain and first officer of each flight crew.  The paired comparison scales 
asked the pilot to evaluate each of the four display concept in comparison to one another on four 
constructs: Situation Awareness (SA-Subjective Workload Dominance (SWORD)), Mental 
Workload (SWORD), Taxi Efficiency, and Surface Operations and Taxi Safety.  The analyses 
were conducted separately for captain and first officer responses.  Significant results reported are 
at the p <0.01 significance level. 
Situation Awareness 
For the Captain ratings, there was a significant main effect found for situation awareness, 
F(3,30) = 17.37.  A post-hoc test revealed three overlapping subsets: (a) Paper was rated 
significantly lower for situation awareness (SA-SWORD) than the other three display concepts; 
(b) the Advanced EMM was rated significantly lower than the Advanced HWD but not 
significantly different from the Advanced HUD; and (c) no significant differences between the 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD concepts. 
For the First Officer ratings, there was a significant main effect for situation awareness, 
F(3,30) = 17.9. A post-hoc test revealed that Paper was rated significantly lower for situation 
awareness (SA-SWORD) than the other three display concepts.  No other effects were found to 
be significant. 
Mental Workload 
For the Captain ratings, there was a significant main effect found for mental workload, 
SWORD, F(3,30) = 366.69.  A post-hoc test revealed that Paper was rated significantly higher 
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for mental workload than the other three display concepts.  There were no differences between 
the other 3 display conditions for mental workload, as assessed by SWORD. 
For the First Officer ratings, there was a significant main effect found for mental 
workload, F(3,30) = 91.33.  A post-hoc test revealed that Paper was rated significantly higher for 
mental workload than the other three display concepts and there were no differences between 
these concepts. 
Taxi Efficiency 
For the Captain ratings, there was a significant main effect found for taxi efficiency, 
F(3,30) = 25.76.  A post-hoc test revealed three overlapping subsets: (a) Paper was rated 
significantly lower for taxi efficiency than the other three display concepts; (b) the Advanced 
EMM was rated significantly lower for taxi efficiency than both the Advanced HUD and 
Advanced HWD; and (c) no significant differences between the Advanced HUD and Advanced 
HWD concepts. 
For the First Officer ratings, there was a significant main effect found for taxi efficiency, 
F(3,30) = 32.96.  A post-hoc test revealed that Paper was rated significantly lower for taxi 
efficiency than the other three display concepts.  No other effects were found to be significant. 
Surface Operations and Taxi Safety 
For the Captain ratings, there was a significant main effect found for taxi safety, F(3,30) 
= 4.9.  However, subsequent post-hoc pair-wise comparison (Bonferroni) failed to find any mean 
difference significant at the α = 0.05 level. 
For the First Officer ratings, there was a significant main effect found for taxi safety, 
F(3,30) = 14.74.  A post-hoc test revealed that Paper was rated significantly lower for taxi safety 
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than the other three display concepts.  There were no significant differences for taxi safety 
between the other three display concepts. 
HWD Usability 
To get a general appreciation of the HWD usability for surface operations, a relatively 
simple, but broad-based usability tool was used (Brooke, 1996).   After the completion of the 
experiment, the captains completed a questionnaire addressing a variety of technology usability 
issues.  By using this broad-brushed scale, a large range of issues were addressed from 
complexity to usefulness.  A comparative evaluation with the head-down or head-up displays 
was not conducted. The 10 pilot rated statements of the HWD usability were:  
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently 
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex 
3. I thought the system was easy to use 
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this 
system 
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated 
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system 
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly 
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use 
9. I felt very confident using the system 
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system 
 
The 10 usability questions are scored (equal weighting) to give an overall rating between 
0 and 100 (Figure 11).  The positive statements (the odd statements, Figure 12) were weighted by 
a factor of 2 while the negative statements (the even statements, Figure 13) were reversed scored 
and weighted by a factor of two.  Figures 12 and 13 are boxplots (Tukey, 1977) that present the 
smallest and largest values, the lower and upper quartiles and the median for each usability 
statement.  For the experiment, the average score for the HWD concept was a 75 for 12 pilots.  
The scores ranged from a maximum of 95 to a low of 52.5 with a 10 point standard deviation 
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around the mean.  The rationale for these scores can be determined from responses to the 
individual questions. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 11 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Overall, the system was given high marks by almost all the crews for being easy to use, 
not being overly complex, and being well integrated.  The poor marks were due primarily to 
some strong negative opinions by certain pilots.  For these questions, a “bi-polar” response was 
given to whether the system operation could be easily learned (7 pilots strongly agreed that it 
could, but 3 pilots were neutral to this question) and whether the pilots thought the system was 
cumbersome to use (3 strongly disagreed with this statement, but 4 were neutral to moderately 
agreeing to it.)   
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 12 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 13 here 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Another source of disagreement and negative ratings was in response to whether the 
pilots would “use the system frequently.”  Four pilots strongly agreed with this statement but 3 
pilots moderately disagreed.  This question should have been better posed since it could be 
interpreted several ways.  For instance, if taken in the context of everyday operation, the pilots 
might have been rating how often poor weather and limited visibility necessitate the need for 
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HWD taxi assistance.  Or, they might have interpreted the question as asking whether they felt 
this system improved their ability to safely and efficiently conduct surface operations in general.   
The good scores are encouraging but the negative scores point to needed areas for 
improvement.  Captains felt the HWD showed high potential but that refinement is clearly 
needed. 
DISCUSSION 
Taxi Performance Results 
The results with the Advanced HUD in this experiment are similar to the results from 
previous surface operations research conducted by NASA Ames and NASA Langley (e.g., 
McCann et al., 1998).  This lends credence to our experimental methods.  
The taxi performance data showed no significant differences between the Advanced 
EMM, Advanced HUD, and Advanced HWD display concepts for the dependent variables 
measured, but pilots taxied at significantly faster speeds and more accurately with these displays 
than when taxiing with just paper charts alone.  On average, pilots were able to complete the taxi 
route 15% faster with the advanced concepts compared to Paper.  Previous T-NASA research 
reported taxi speed increases in the range of 16% to 26% (Hooey et al., 2001).  Additionally, the 
crews made significantly more navigation errors with the paper charts than with any of the other 
three advanced display concepts.  As one would expect intuitively, the data support that 
advanced display concepts provided information (e.g., cleared route, ownship position, taxi 
guidance cues) and enabled faster, safer, and more efficient taxi than paper.  
No quantitative taxi performance differences were found in this study differentiating 
head-up versus head-down display concepts (when displaying essentially the same or similar 
information).  The taxi performance data showed no significant differences between the 
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advanced concepts for route accuracy or taxi speeds.  This result is somewhat counter-intuitive 
since the EMM is designed to promote strategic taxi information needs, whereas the head-up 
concepts (HUD and HWD) are designed to promote tactical taxi information needs.  These 
results suggests that the flight crew could effectively use the EMM concepts for tactical taxi 
decision-making despite their head-down location.   
Comparing the Advanced HWD and Advanced HUD concepts, there were no statistically 
significant taxi performance differences.  This result was expected since the information content 
of the two concepts was essentially identical for taxi performance.   
Required Navigation Performance 
As NextGen concepts emerge, the importance of Required Total Performance 
(Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance) will certainly permeate through all future 
operational scenarios.  The data from this experiment were cast into RNP to assess how this 
philosophy may apply in surface operations.  The data shows that none of the display concepts 
were within surface RNP requirements as proposed by Cassell et al. (1999).  This result raises 
several issues.   
The taxi routes used in this experiment were very challenging by design especially when 
considering the given visibility conditions.  Nonetheless, future operations require VFR-like 
safety and operational tempos in all weather conditions, especially in surface operations.  The 
display concepts did not include an explicit display of Surface Operations RNP / Actual 
Navigation Performance (ANP) information, like that required for flight operations.  These 
concepts should be evaluated in future work to assess if they are required or practical.   
Even with concepts that explicitly showed taxi path, the crews were instructed to get to 
the gate as quickly as practical.  In addition to RNP display concepts for surface operations, the 
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FTE component to RNP requirements for surface operations need to be validated and carefully 
considered with taxi efficiency (speed) and safety.   
Subjective Ratings 
The results of the paired comparisons showed that the addition of a head-up or head-worn 
display subjectively increased taxi efficiency compared to just having an advanced EMM alone.  
These results agree with past research conducted at NASA Ames Research Center demonstrating 
that the combination of head-up display and head-down display taxi concepts provides superior 
taxi performance.  This subjective preference did not, however, manifest itself in quantitative 
performance.  However, when the subject captains were asked to rate their overall impressions of 
situation awareness, the SA-SWORD results did reveal that both the Advanced HUD and 
Advanced HWD provided significantly higher SA than the Advanced EMM concept.   
The mental workload results as measured by the SWORD post-run questionnaire, 
revealed that the advanced display concepts were rated as having significantly lower mental 
workload than the Paper concept.   There were no significant differences found between the three 
advanced display concepts for the SWORD construct.   
No significant differences were found across the any of the subjective constructs between 
Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD, suggesting that these two display concepts provide for 
equal amounts of perceived situation awareness, mental workload, taxi efficiency, and taxi 
safety.  This result – and the quantitative performance shown above – suggest that the unlimited 
FOV provided by the HWD and its color characteristics did not provide any advantages over the 
HUD in this test.  Further analysis of this result will be conducted in association with the HWD 
design, investigating the influence of HWD latency, display FOV, monocular/biocular display 
design and HWD format/information. 
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Runway Incursions 
The nose-to-nose rare event was designed to highlight traffic awareness by the crew.  All 
crews with display concepts that had traffic information (Advanced EMM, Advanced HUD, and 
Advanced HWD) were able to avoid the nose-to-nose situation.  Crews had information available 
within the cockpit that contradicted the controller's clearance.  Crews contacted the ground 
controller to resolve the discrepancy to avoid costly and potentially hazardous mistakes.  Further, 
crews commented that the information presented on the HUD provided no additional benefit in 
detecting this rare event in contrast to the information available on the HWD (e.g., traffic).  In 
other words, the Advanced HWD presented another source for displaying traffic information that 
supplemented information being presented on the Advanced EMM head-down display. 
Head Tracking 
Two issues that influenced this work were the head-tracker size and its 
alignment/accuracy.  For this experiment, the HWD was installed on a helmet to provide a stable 
mounting location for the head-tracker.  This configuration resulted in significant pilot 
encumbrance and head-borne weight.  Also, the HWD was aligned with the scene by displaying 
a grid pattern in the HWD and the same pattern in the out-the-window visuals.  For actual 
operations, the alignment process must be quick, reliable and with a pre-determined degree of 
integrity and assurance.  Further, the HWD image stability and alignment must be maintained 
during operation.  (With a HUD, this boresighting procedure is done once and “hard-mounted” 
into the aircraft.)  Current research efforts are exploring the use of optical head tracking 
techniques that would minimize or eliminate these HWD “costs.”  Otherwise, any dollar savings, 
derived by weight reductions for HWD-equipage would be out-weighed by the cost in 
developing a robust procedure for HWD alignment, image correlation, and pilot “encumbrance.” 
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CONCLUSIONS 
At the start of a data collection day (without experiencing any of the concepts), most 
crews commented that the head down Advanced EMM was the only display needed.  Subject 
pilots commented that the Advanced EMM concept was a “quantum leap” for surface awareness 
compared to the “baseline” (i.e., paper charts).  However, it became clear to them over the course 
of the experiment that even greater enhancements to situation awareness were provided by the 
head-up displays (HUD and HWD).  This observation was clearly reflected in their ratings.   
The results suggest that the Advanced HUD and Advanced HWD are comparable to each 
other with regard to mental workload, taxi efficiency, taxi performance, and perceived taxi 
safety.  There were a few limitations of the implementation of the HWD concept that may have 
reduced its full potential to demonstrate marked differences between the capabilities of the HUD 
and HWD concepts.   
Although no statistically significant quantitative efficiency or safety advantages of the 
advanced HWD were shown over the HUD, there are other considerations that argue for a HWD 
solution.  On the ground, one of the main tasks of the crew is to survey all around the aircraft to 
avoid collisions with other airplanes or objects on the airport surface.  The typical viewing area 
of a HUD is 30˚ H by 24˚ V, which is sufficient for flight but not necessarily for surface 
operations.  This limitation was especially evident in the present experiment when the flight crew 
attempted turns but the path was only displayed as virtual turn flags in the HUD due to required 
over-steering.  This attribute will be evaluated in future work.  Further, the HWD provides 
potential weight savings that would have significant cost advantages to operators.   
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FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES 
The experiments revealed numerous future directions to better optimize and develop 
these concepts.  One future direction involves the integration of enhanced vision sensor 
technology for surface operations.  The capability for “equivalent visual operations” in-flight and 
on the surface is a goal of NextGen to obtain the safety and operational tempos of Visual Flight, 
independent of the actual weather conditions.  HWD concepts will be evaluated for their efficacy 
to support “Equivalent Visual Operations” and evaluated in scenarios representative of emerging 
NextGen concepts such as 4D surface operations.  Applications will test the necessity for 
unlimited field-of-regard and color capability while trading-off HWD design issues, such as 
display format, display FOV, and monocular/biocular optics.  RNP requirements for surface 
operations will be validated and tested against speed and safety of 4D surface operations.   
Further, for these experiments, the routing and clearance information was relayed to the 
aircraft displays via a simulated controller data-link.  Currently, the IIFD/Crew-Vehicle Interface 
team is conducting research employing voice recognition technology to quickly and accurately 
enter routing information during read-back.  The potential also exists for conducting analysis of 
the speech and airport information for route awareness and route / track crew-error analysis. 
A significant body of research has shown that runway incursions can be mitigated or even 
prevented via flight deck alerting.  For this experiment, however, the crew's situation awareness 
in the absence of alerting was of most interest.  Alerting, in conjunction with these displays, 
would clearly add significantly to enhancing further the safety of surface operations.  Future 
research will evaluate the additive effects of including such alerting algorithms, derived from the 
NASA RIPS research, to determine whether further safety enhancements to airport surface 
operations are possible. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the T-NASA concept.  
 
 
Figure 2. RIPS HUD concept. 
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Figure 3. The HWD concept and envisioned use in future advanced cockpits. 
 
 
Figure 4. The nose-to-nose scenario on the EMM. 
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Figure 5. The display concepts evaluated in the experiment. 
 
Figure 6.  Example of the HUD concept used in the experiment. 
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Figure 7.  Displayed image for the HWD concept. 
Figure 8. Speed and RMS path error per display concept. 
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Figure 9. Navigational errors made per display concept. 
 
Figure 10. Surface RNP. 
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Figure 11. HWD scores for Usability Questionnaire. 
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Figure 12. Subject captains’ responses to positive statements. 
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Figure 13. Subject captains’ responses for negative questions. 
 
